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ABSTRACT PAGE
Evolutionary psychology h as  dem onstrated  that the quick and effortless categorization of 
an  individual's race is a  by-product of cognitive adaptations designed  by natural selection 
to track coalition affiliations. Furthermore, two key inputs tend to maximize the 
categorization of individuals into coalitions: (1) patterns of cooperation and (2) 
corresponding shared  ap p earan ces . The current studies attem pted to explore possible 
regulatory effects that coalitional com putations have on the mu rhythm -  an 
electrophysiological phenom enon implicated in a wide range of social cognitive p rocesses. 
R esults indicate that th ese  com putations have no significant regulatory effects on the mu 
rhythm in the passive viewing of racial outgroups, a s  well a s  a  competitive scenario 
betw een established coalitions. Limitations are  d iscussed  along with implications for both 
the coalition literature and the functioning of the mu rhythm.
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1Possible Regulatory Effects of Coalition Computations on the Mu Rhythm
As humans navigate their social world gathering information to guide behavior, 
they often begin by forming impressions of others (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). This 
process is conventionally termed “person perception” and is reported as occurring 
quickly (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Dickter & Bartholow, 2007; Zarate & Smith, 1990) and 
effortlessly (Fiske, 1998), often leading to the categorization of individuals based on 
visually prominent features (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 1998). Furthermore, social 
psychologists continue to discover that the categories of sex and race tend to be identified 
easily (Fiske et’al., 1999) in less than a second upon viewing an individual (Dickter & 
Bartholow, 2007; Ito & Urland, 2003), often leading to the activation of stereotypes 
(Bartholow & Dickter, 2008) and nonverbal biases (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008).
Kurzban, Tooby and Cosmides (2001) have extended these findings by 
demonstrating that the cognitive mechanism used to categorize race likely evolved to 
detect and track coalitions, not race per se. Furthermore, it has been suggested that this 
coalition mechanism is optimized to process (1) patterns of cooperation and (2) visual 
cues corresponding to these patterns (Kurzban et al., 2001). Although there is evidence of 
nonverbal “biases”, behavioral acts that contribute to communication in social 
interactions (i.e. failure to mimic facial expressions), as a result of coalition detection 
(Weisbuch & Ambady, 2008; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004), it is unknown how the 
coalition mechanism regulates these nonverbal biases. A well documented 
psychophysiological phenomenon, the mu rhythm, is thought to provide a necessary 
antecedent of many nonverbal behaviors (Pineda, 2005), making it an ideal candidate to
2be regulated by the coalition mechanism. To bridge this gap, the current studies will 
explore the possible regulatory effects that coalition computations have on the mu 
rhythm.
The literature review below is structured in the following way: (1) the theoretical 
framework, (2) race or coalitions, and (3) the mu rhythm. Therefore, the first section will 
be a proper review of the theoretical framework, often called evolutionary psychology. 
Next, the social psychological phenomenon surrounding person perception will be 
reviewed in terms of the evolutionary psychology framework previously discussed. 
Finally, the incorporation of embodied social cognition into the evolutionary framework 
will introduce the mu rhythm as a psychophysiological phenomenon crucial to the 
production of nonverbal social behavior (Pineda, 2005). This will ultimately lead to the 
hypothesis that the cognitive mechanisms evolved to detect and track coalitions, might 
regulate the desynchronization of the mu rhythm, providing for a potential 
neurophysiological basis for nonverbal “biases”.
Modern Evolutionary Theory
“Nothing makes sense in biology except in the light of evolution.” (Dobzhansky, 
1964,pp. 449)
The complexity of the brain/mind and the enormous variability in human behavior 
is a rather impressive and humbling phenomenon to consider, but with a proper 
understanding of natural selection, the underlying order of this complexity and variability 
can be revealed (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). What follows is an overview of natural 
selection which will bring to the forefront three important principles of evolutionary
3psychology that will be applied throughout the current research.
The overview will (1) demonstrate the basic logic behind natural selection, (2) 
extend this with a discussion of inclusive fitness, and;(3) define the three products of 
natural selection: adaptations, by-products, and noise. These basic concepts will then be 
applied to the brain/mind and human behavior, highlighting three important principles of 
evolutionary psychology that will be applied in the current research.
Natural Selection. The process of natural selection is capable of generating 
functional complexity by utilizing existing variability within a phenotype to solve a 
specific problem faced by the organism in possession of the phenotype (Dawkins, 1986; 
Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998). These phenotypes are inherited 
traits that arise from the interaction between developmental programs specified by the 
genotype and necessary environmental inputs, making successful reproduction critical to 
the selection process (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). As the variability in a given phenotype 
interacts with a particular aspect of the environment, a subset of the versions in the given 
phenotype may allow the organism an advantage in the rate of survival, and thus 
reproduction. More successful reproduction often increases the frequency of the versions 
of a phenotype that initially allowed for an advantage in the organism's survival and 
reproduction, creating a positive feedback loop. Over evolutionary time, if the specific 
problem that elucidated functional differences between the versions of a phenotype 
reliably recurs, the differential propagation of the most successful phenotypic designs 
will emerge as a species-typical trait. On a larger scale, where multiple phenotypes 
interact with multiple environmental problems, an array of complexly organized,
functionally distinct species-typical traits emerges (see Darwin, 1859/1958; Dawkins, 
1976, 1986).
For example, the complex functional organization of the human eye emerged 
through successive iterations of natural selection. One <?an imagine a variety of co­
existing cells, some sensitive to changes in pH, others sensitive to electrochemical 
gradients, and others sensitive to changes in illumination. Individuals within a species in 
possession of the light-sensitive cells were capable of detecting shifts in light generated 
by other moving objects, and in particular -  predators. Over evolutionary time those 
individuals equipped with the light-sensitive cells received an advantage in survival, and 
thus out-reproduced those organisms without the light-sensitive cells. Next, as these 
light-sensitive cells begin to form membranes, a variety of shapes likely existed, in which 
some may have been straight, while others were curved. In fact curved light-sensitive 
membranes begin to focus light, generating the initial forms of a lens. Again, this curved 
design affords the individuals in possession of it a survival or reproductive advantage, 
leading to the differential propagation of this phenotypic design. Over evolutionary time, 
additional solutions to survival and reproductive problems may be solved by versions of 
the light-sensitive membranes, eventually leading to the human eye. This constant 
gradation propelled by functionality, ultimately leads to organized complexity, which 
could not have emerged by chance alone (Dawkins, 1976, 1986). Although this 
conceptualization of natural selection is adequate in understanding the emergence of the 
eye, it cannot explain the emergence of many behaviors emitted by organisms that reduce 
their own rates of survival and reproduction (Dawkins* 1976).
5Inclusive Fitness. To address this issue, Hamilton (1964) proposed the idea of 
inclusive fitness. Hamilton (1964) suggested that successful reproduction by an 
individual is not the only way a phenotype can increase in frequency within a population. 
In addition, organisms may emit behavior that enhances the survival or reproduction of 
close genetic relatives who likely carry the genes necessary to produce some of the same 
phenotypes (Buss et al., 1998). This insight led Dawkins (1976) to conclude that natural 
selection operates at the genetic level, because a gene is the smallest piece of organic 
matter containing information that can reliably be replicated over successive generations. 
This suggests that it is not the species or individual, but the gene that provides natural 
selection with the necessary fuel to proceed. In other words, Dawkins (1976) suggests 
that organisms (including humans) are vehicles of replication for genes, and that the 
phenotypes produced are tools used by the genes to continue to replicate. To avoid the 
erroneous “genetic determinism” interpretation of Da wkins' (1986) conclusion, Tooby 
and Cosmides (1990) state that natural selection acts through the genes, but acts on the 
interaction between developmental programs specified by the genes and the environment, 
highlighting that the genes and environment equally co-determine the phenotypic designs 
of an organism. Although phenotypic designs interact with recurring problems in the 
environment ultimately leading to adaptations, not every feature of an organisms is an 
adaptation.
Adaptations, By-products, and Noise. In fact, tfie process of natural selection 
produces a variety of effects that can be organized into three classes: Adaptations, by­
products, and noise (Buss et. al, 1998; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Buss and colleagues
(1998) define an adaptation as “...an inherited and reliably developing characteristic that 
came into existence as a feature of a species through natural selection because it helped to 
directly or indirectly facilitate reproduction during the period of its evolution (after Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1992).” Furthermore, adaptations are typically ubiquitous within a species’ 
traits, with a few exceptions, but are not necessarily present at birth, nor free from 
environmental influence (Buss et. al, 1998).
The second class of effects produced by the evolutionary process is by-products. 
By-products are features or characteristics that do not contribute to solving an adaptive 
problem, but are reliably inherited because they are a property of an adaptation. An 
example of a by-product is the apparent whiteness of bones. Bones were selected for 
because high concentrations of calcium provided the necessary strength required to 
support and protect an organism, but because high concentrations of calcium appear 
white, bones tend to be white (Buss et. al, 1998; Symons, 1992).
The last product of the evolutionary process is genetic noise. Variability in the 
genotype emerges by genetic drift, mutations or pathogen driven co-evolution of 
biochemical diversity. In each scenario, the variations In the genotype may present 
superficial variations in the phenotype, some of which interrupt the functioning of the 
organism, while others remain benign. An example of genetic noise is the variations 
within humans on the shape and size of their stomachs. Although there is variability on 
the shape and size of human stomachs, this variability does not compromise the 
functional integrity of the organ. The importance of genetic noise, however, is that it 
introduces phenotypic variability which is precisely what natural selection needs to solve
future adaptive problems (see Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).
In sum, by making the process of natural selection explicit during empirical 
investigations of the brain/mind and human behavigr, the underlying order of its immense 
complexity may be revealed. However, given the conceptual framework discussed thus 
far, it may appear difficult or irrelevant to apply to human psychology. As it turns out, a 
number of scientists have already successfully applied the logic of natural selection to 
human psychology generating a number of crucial insights into human nature, three of 
which will be applied explicitly in the current research. These three key principles deal 
with (1) adopting a functional perspective when studying the brain/mind, (2) the nature of 
the cognitive adaptations that comprise the brain/mind, and 3) the physical instantiation 
of these adaptations in relation to their function.
Evolutionary Psychology
Just as the eye is an organ shaped by natural selection to solve recurring adaptive 
problems, so too is the brain. Ignoring this fact has led many social sciences to be “adrift” 
in search for answers about human nature — producing a compilation of descriptions and 
proximate explanations at best, while simultaneously isolating the study of the human 
mind from the natural sciences (Tooby & Cosmides, pp. 23, 1992).
With a proper understanding of natural selection several predictions about human 
psychology emerge that should be seriously considered when investigating any 
psychological phenomenon. Three of these predictions will serve as the principles 
guiding the current investigation. First, questions regarding functionality are central to 
understanding human nature. Second, the brain/mind contains an array of functionally
8autonomous content-dependent, information-processing units, or cognitive mechanisms. 
Lastly, these cognitive mechanisms are physically instantiated as neurons, glial cells, and 
astrocytes, yet the location of their instantiation is only important insofar as the 
functionality is not compromised, making the brain and the mind different perspectives 
on exactly the same physical substance (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
Functionalism. In recent years, the field of psychology has seen a growth of 
interdisciplinary approaches reflecting the desire to explore phenomena at multiple levels 
of analysis (i.e. cultural, neurological). Although these approaches provide a unique 
perspective on any given psychological phenomenon, they are not capable of 
transcending all other levels of analysis and providing ultimate explanations. Once a field 
discovers the level of analysis that can thoroughly unravel the immense complexity of 
their topic — the level that allows for the highest resolution of insight into the underlying 
order — it begins to make great strides in scientific discovery (Tooby & Cosmides, pp. 63, 
1992). From an evolutionary perspective, the most logical and promising level of analysis 
is that of functionalism.
Ermer, Cosmides, & Tooby (2007) define the function of a biological mechanism as 
“the problem it solved — the consequences it had — that caused the propagation of its 
genetic basis relative to that of alternative mechanisms” (p. 153). This approach has been 
informing biologists for decades now, and in particular, anatomists have successfully 
carved the human body at its joints (Buss, 1995). For example, the heart functions to 
circulate blood throughout the body, whatever its proximity to, or similarity in 
appearance with the lungs or the liver, it is considered a distinct organ because of its
9distinct function. By utilizing the functional level of analysis, anatomists and physicians 
are well-equipped to make predictions about which variables will or will not affect the 
heart. Similarly, to “carve” human psychology “at its joints” the functional level of 
analysis is thought to be necessary (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
From the standpoint of evolutionary theory, the functional level of analysis 
logically follows because the existence of an adaptive biological mechanism is dependent 
upon its functional success, or its ability to enhance its own propagation (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992). Although the same biological mechanism may be described from 
multiple perspectives, understanding the adaptive problems it solved will reveal its 
underlying order. This does not leave some features of a complex biological mechanism 
unexplained, rather it provides the necessary frame of reference to being unraveling 
which features are necessary for the mechanism to function, which are by-products, and 
which are random variations. For example, the function of the heart is to pump blood, 
therefore features such as valves and chambers contribute to its function, while the red 
appearance the heart takes on is simply a by-product of the material used to make the 
valves and chambers. Without starting with the function of a complex biological 
mechanism, there is no way to predict which features, when manipulated, will alter the 
outcome. Furthermore, the function of a biological mechanism may be realized on 
multiple levels (i.e. chemical, individual, cultural), but only the functional level is 
capable of transcending these alternative levels of analysis to provide ultimate 
explanations for organized complexity.
Broadly speaking, a functional level of analysis suggests that the brain/mind
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functions as an information-processing unit, to guide an organism’s behavior in adaptive 
ways on average (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; 1995). However, knowing that the 
brain/mind had to solve an array of problems, each of, which shaped its design, 
evolutionary theory further suggests that the brain/mind is comprised of several domain- 
specific content-dependent cognitive mechanisms (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992).
Cognitive Mechanisms. The process of natural selection, although powerful 
enough to engineer complex functionally organized biological mechanisms, does so 
without any of the advantages a human engineer possesses (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). 
That is, natural selection does not have any foresight and it cannot start from scratch each 
generation (Dawkins, 1976; 1986). Over evolutionary time, phenotypic designs interact 
with the environment, encountering both old and new adaptive problems that must be 
solved with whatever phenotypic designs happened to have made it up to that point. 
Without foresight, or an end goal, natural selection is not capable of designing a 
biological mechanism to solve a problem in the future; rather it only determines the 
propagation of a phenotype based on how well that phenotype solves current adaptive 
problems. Resulting from this lack of foresight and inability to start from scratch are 
multiple biological mechanisms, each well-equipped to solve the specific recurring 
adaptive problems that shaped its design (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
Traditionally, psychologists and neuroscientists have argued for a domain-general 
or all-purpose learning conceptualization of the brain/mind, typically due to the 
observation that the human intellect is extremely flexible, citing classical and operant
11
conditioning studies for support. However, theoreticfiUy informed empirical evidence 
appears to suggest that the brain/mind is comprised of domain-specific cognitive 
mechanisms designed by natural selection to optimally, but by no means exclusively, 
process the information that was necessary to solve the recurring adaptive problems that 
shaped it (Duchaine, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2001; Gallistel & Gibbon, 2000; Hirschfeld & 
Gelman, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
Considering the constraints placed on the process of natural selection in 
conjunction with the need to solve multiple adaptive problems within a generation, a 
domain-specific view of the brain/mind logically follows. First, consider the fact that an 
organism faces multiple adaptive problems, many of which require very different 
computations. For example, the computations necessary to interpret the 2-D retinal 
display as a 3-D scene requires the use of Bayesian probability (Pinker, 1997, pp. 243), 
yet the computations necessary to detect a cheater require conditional logic (Cosmides, 
1989). Neither system is capable of reliably solving both problems, so natural selection 
could not have used the same computations in both scenarios. Instead natural selection 
would have had to build in another sub-routine, or mechanism, to perform both sets of 
computations, making the system domain-specific and inherently more flexible (see 
Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
Proponents of the domain-general View often suggest that domain-specificity 
cannot account for the phenomena of classical and operant conditioning, instead 
purporting an association model (Duchaine et al., 2001). However, Gallistel and Gibbon 
(2000) have demonstrated that classical and operant conditioning is best captured by
12
domain-specific mechanisms designed by natural selection to compute future 
uncertainties while foraging. These mechanisms use multivariate nonstationary time- 
series analyses to predict many of the intricate conditioning phenomena that association 
models have failed explain (Duchaine et al., 2000).
Empirical evidence of domain-specificity is not confined to conditioning, but is 
evident in face recognition (Kanwisher, McDermott, Chun, 1997; Kanwisher, 2000; 
McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1996), language acquisition (Pinker, 1984, 1989), self­
esteem (Kirkpatrick, Waugh, Valencia, & Webster, 2002), vision (Marr, 1982), and 
perception (Proffitt & Gilden, 1989), to name a few (see Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, pp. 
97). Not only do these findings support a domain-specific view of the cognitive 
mechanisms that comprise the brain/mind, but they also suggest, if not require, that these 
mechanisms contain built-in assumptions.
One of the first problems faced by any computational machine, biological or 
otherwise, is the issue of combinatorial explosion (Tociby & Cosmides, 1992). 
Combinatorial explosion refers to the fact that as the degrees of freedom within a 
system's decision repertoire increases, the total number of alternative decisions 
exponentially grows to staggering numbers (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). The most striking 
example of this comes out of the language acquisition literature (Pinker, 2002; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992). After behaviorism failed to properly explain how humans everywhere 
are capable of acquiring language within a time span too short for operant and classical 
conditioning, Noam Chomsky introduced the idea of mental organs with built-in rules or 
assumptions to guide language development (Pinker, 1.997, 2002; Tooby & Cosmides,
13
1992). Chomsky considered that with all of the possible utterances a human can make, 
the brain must come equipped with assumptions regarding how to structure them in 
systematic ways, so much so that nearly every language on earth is capable of following
i
one of two main structures (Pinker, 2002). Only by considering a brain/mind equipped 
with a set of rules or assumptions that reflect the underlying order of the adaptive 
problems it was designed to solve, was Chomsky capable of explaining language 
acquisition in the face of combinatorial explosion.
From the point of view of natural selection, cognitive mechanisms with built-in 
assumptions are the same as any slight modification made to a phenotype to solve an 
adaptive problem. If there were no selection pressures to rule out alternative designs of 
the human eye, it is likely that eyes would merely be variations of light-sensitive 
membranes, rather than the extremely complex design we witness today. In fact, if the 
brain/mind did not contain built-in assumptions, it would suggest that natural selection 
never filtered out any one particular design of the brain, meaning that the brain would not 
be capable of accomplishing much of anything (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). It is apparent, 
anecdotally as well as experimentally, that the brain/mind can solve an array of complex 
problems in a very dynamic fashion. Many artificial intelligence, vision, and perceptual 
scientists have concluded that the brain/mind does in fact contain built-in assumptions, 
otherwise the computations made by the visual cortex *vould remain unsolvable, therefore 
many adaptive problems would remain unsolvable as well (Pinker, 1997, 2002; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992).
Adelson and Pentland (1996) describe how the visual cortex must compute the
14
luminance of a surface by combining illumination and reflectance. However, the brain 
begins with the product -  luminance -  and must infer the shading and reflectance. 
Adelson and Pentland (1996) explain that this multiplication cannot be unraveled, so the 
visual cortex must make assumptions about regularities in the natural world. Pinker 
(1997) uses the example of distinguishing between a lump of coal and a snowball viewed 
outside and indoors. The visual cortex must assume that the world is equally lit in order 
to continue to “see” the coal as coal and the snowball as a snowball in both conditions. 
Without this built-in assumption the problem becomes unsolvable (Pinker, 1997).
Most of the evidence of built-in assumptions can be found in the vision and 
perceptual sciences, but more examples of the same concept are beginning to emerge 
elsewhere in psychology. For example, infants exhibit an attention bias to structures that 
resemble human faces so early in development that experience cannot account for the 
phenomenon (Morton & Johnson, 1990). In addition, the categorization literature has 
discovered that infants overwhelmingly categorize objects at their basic level, at which 
the most information regarding the objects affordances can be revealed (Rosch, Mervis, 
Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976), suggesting that there must be some innate set of 
rules to guide this process. Each and every single computation made by these functionally 
autonomous domain-specific and content-dependent cognitive mechanisms is physically 
instantiated in the brain tissue, but ignoring their function and concentrating solely on 
neural activity may produce misleading ideas about human nature.
Brain/Mind. An age old question in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy has 
been the relationship between the brain and the mind. An evolutionary approach suggests
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that the mind and the brain are one in the same, with the chemical make-up, cellular 
structure and neural organization being levels of functional implementation that may be 
altered by natural selection to successfully produce § cognitive adaptation. However, 
considering that the cortex is structurally uniform within and between mammals (Rockel, 
Hioms, & Powell, 1980) and that the major neurotransmitters cover large regions of the 
brain, it appears that the intricate connectivity of the neural tissue is the only way to 
capture the physical implementation of a cognitive adaptation (Rockel et al., 1980). Even 
if the technology were available to discover the intricate connectivity, it would merely 
provide a description and not an explanation for a cognitive adaptation. As Marr (1982) 
suggests, “trying to understand perception by studying only neurons is like trying to 
understand bird flight by studying only feathers” (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995). Ultimately, 
the physical properties of the instantiated cognitive mechanisms place rather trivial 
constraints on the adaptive design because the process of natural selection is concerned 
with functional success which may be achieved just as well with different neural 
underpinnings (Cosmides & Tooby, 1995). It may be best to consider the brain as the 
hardware of a computer, and the mind as the software. For example, it is possible for ten 
different computers, with different hardware specifications, to successfully install the 
same word processor application and create identical word documents. If one were to 
“image” the electrical instantiation during the creation of the word document, the 
resulting patterns may be very different, but the functional result is the same.
Recognizing that the brain is an organ shaped by^  natural selection allows for an 
approach to the study of human psychology that can begin to reveal the underlying order
16
of its complexity. In addition, this perspective leads to; several key insights that may be 
applied to study any topic in psychology (Buss, 2005T,Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). First, 
questions regarding function are crucial for revealing the underlying order of the complex 
brain/mind. Second, the brain/mind is comprised of domain-specific, content-dependent 
cognitive mechanisms designed by natural selection to solve recurring problems in our 
evolutionary history. Lastly, these cognitive mechanisms are physically instantiated in the 
neural and chemical structure of the brain, but the structure is ancillary to its function. 
Taking this into account, the current research will employ a functional level of analysis to 
investigate the domain-specific and content-dependent cognitive mechanisms involved in 
the social psychological phenomenon of racial biases.
Race
Investigations of racial biases in real-world scenarios reveal that Blacks accused of 
violent crimes were more likely to receive the death penalty than Whites accused of 
equally violent crimes (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, 2006). In simulated real- 
world environments White participants were significantly more likely to misperceive a 
tool as a gun when primed with a Black face as opposed to a White face (Payne, 2001), 
and were significantly more likely to shoot an unarmed Black individual than an unarmed 
White individual in a computer simulation (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2007). 
These findings have encouraged many researchers to investigate the underlying 
mechanisms that may give rise to such profound racial biases.
There exist many empirical findings highlighting racial biases; however, the present 
review will focus on those related to attention, memory, and nonverbal biases. Trawalter,
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Todd, Baird, and Richeson (2008) used a dot-probe paradigm to test relative attention 
between Black male and White male faces. The results indicated that Black male faces 
captured the attention of White participants more than White male faces. Other studies of 
attention have found that White participants differentially attend to Black faces within 
100 ms of stimulus onset (Ito & Urland, 2003). Furthermore, these attention biases appear 
to activate stereotypical concepts, as evidenced in the simultaneous presentation of the 
face and stereotype-related words facilitating categorization (Bartholow & Dickter,
2008).
Precisely how these attention biases impact later processing is not fully known, but 
some researchers suggest that it may account for the “own-race bias” (ORB) in face 
recognition (Hills, & Lewis, 2006). The ORB in face recognition is the robust effect 
found when White participants view a series of White and Black faces, but make more 
errors when remembering the Black faces at a later time period (Meissner & Brigham, 
2001). Other researchers have used eye-tracking technology to support the idea that 
attention biases cannot account for the ORB in face recognition, but instead White 
participants are less sensitive to changes in Black face$ (Hirose & Hancock, 2007).
A failure of White participants to detect changes in Black faces can also be found in 
emotion processing. For example, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2004) showed White 
participants computer generated White and Black faces whose expression changed from 
happy to angry or from angry to happy at precisely the same rate. White participants were 
faster to indicate a happy expression on a White face and an angry expression on a Black 
face, demonstrating that racial “biases” may exist in nonverbal communication as well.
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Ingroup/Outgroup. Although plenty of findings suggest that White participants 
exhibit several biases when encountering a Black face, some researchers have called into 
question the extent to which these effects are restricted to White participants (Dickter & 
Bartholow, 2007; Kurzban et al., 2001). In fact many of the biases recently reviewed have 
been generalized to racial outgroups. For example, Dickter and Bartholow (2007) had 
Black and White participants complete a modified flanker task, in which an array of 
Black and White faces were presented. The participants were asked to identify whether 
the face in the center was a male or female as electro-cortical activity was being recorded. 
The results indicated that both Black and White participants attended to racial outgroup 
faces at around 200 ms. This study suggests that racial “biases” may exist when a person 
of any race perceives a member of their racial outgroup.
Further investigations into the ORB face recognition bias and the recognition of 
emotion biases reveals that the effects hold true when participants, regardless of race, 
process the face of any racial outgroup member (Weishbuch & Ambady, 2008; Brown, 
Bradley, & Lang, 2006). Based on these findings it appears as though many of these 
biases can be captured by racial ingroup versus racial outgroup processing. These 
findings have led to the claim that during person perception, race is privileged during 
categorization (Fiske et al., 1999).
Coalitions. Although there is little reason to dispute the finding that race is 
categorized quickly and captures the attention of percelvers, the explanation that the 
brain/mind treats race as a privileged category during person perception is misleading in 
light of an evolutionary perspective (Kurzban et al., 2001). As an alternative explanation,
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Kurzban et al. (2001) suggest that race categorization is a byproduct of a cognitive 
mechanism designed by natural selection to detect and track coalitions, not race per se.
To begin with, if race information is processed by a cognitive mechanism, discovering 
why that cognitive mechanism evolved is essential to understanding its underlying order. 
The researchers reasoned that for the majority of human evolutionary history, individuals 
rarely travelled more than 40 miles when establishing new residential locations (Kelly, 
1995), and would rarely, if ever, encounter another human that possesses the phenotypic 
features that we use today to classify races. As such, a cognitive mechanism designed to 
process race information seems implausible (Kurzban et al., 2001). However, humans did 
constantly face the problem of competing with other bands and coalitions for resources 
(Keeley, 1996), so detecting and tracking these affiliations would have been crucial for 
surviving (Kurzban et al., 2001). Furthermore, it was hypothesized that a well designed 
coalition tracking mechanism should contain built-in assumptions making it sensitive to 
(1) patterns of cooperation or allegiance and (2) visual cues corresponding to these 
patterns (Kurzban et al., 2001).
To test the hypothesis that race categorization is a byproduct of a cognitive 
mechanism adapted to detect and track coalitions, Kurzban and colleagues (2001) used a 
memory confusion protocol, in which participants make impressions on a series of faces 
with comments supposedly said by each face. After som$ time, the participants are given 
a surprise memory recall task where they are asked to match each face with the 
corresponding comment. More within group errors, meaning the incorrect pairing of a 
comment to a face, suggest the encoding of that group (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, &
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Ruderman, 1978). Initially, the researchers showed participants Black and White faces in 
which the comments indicated allegiance (e.g. “I've got your back.”). Initially, the cues 
indicating cooperation did not correlate with either the White or Black faces. When 
structured this way, participants made more within group errors in the surprise memory 
recall task, both within races and within coalitions, indicating that they encoded both race 
and coalition. In a separate sample, participants viewed the same White and Black faces 
with the same comments indicating allegiance, except lhat those faces indicating ingroup 
allegiance had yellow shirts superimposed on them, and those faces indicating outgroup 
allegiance had grey shirts superimposed on them. With this new addition of shirt color, 
patterns of cooperation and visual cues were correlated, while simultaneously being 
orthogonal to race. The results of this experiment indicated that participants made more 
within group errors based on coalition (or shirt color) and not race, essentially suggesting 
that participants no longer encoded the race of each face (Kurzban et al., 2001). Taken 
together, this finding demonstrates that the cognitive mechanism that produces the quick 
and effortless categorization of race is in fact designed by natural selection to detect and 
track coalitions, not race per se.
More support for the coalition mechanism can be found in the face recognition 
literature (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007). Van Bavel, Packer, and Cunningham
(2008) assigned participants to one of two mixed-race groups and used an arbitrary team 
name (i.e. Tigers or Leopards) to make group distinctions. Participants viewed faces of 
both their group and the opposing group and were later asked to either identify each face 
by group membership or by race. The functional neuro-imaging results showed that
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participants had significantly more activity in the fusiform face area when viewing 
members of their in-group (i.e. Tigers or Leopards) than their out-group. In addition, 
there were no significant differences in the fusiform face area activity when participants 
had to categorize the faces by race (Van Bavel, Packer, & Cunningham, 2008). These 
results support the notion that the categorization of race leading to face recognition 
biases, are being processed with cognitive mechanisms designed to detect and track 
coalitions, not race per se.
In addition, Mondillon, Niedenthal, & Droit-Volet (2007) discovered that White 
participants mimicked more, and detected faster, the f  ; cig.J expressions of other White 
faces in comparison to Chinese faces. The importance of this finding lies in the 
repercussions that face mimicry, or lack thereof, has oh social interactions. For example 
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) found that increased mimicry of a participant by an 
experimenter, led the participant to rate the experimenter as being more likeable and 
reporting a smoother interaction with them. Similarly, van Baaren, Holland, and 
Kawakami (2004) discovered that participants who were mimicked more by a 
confederate exhibited more prosocial behavior, in that they were more willing to help and 
more likely to donate money to a charity. These findings suggest that nonverbal behavior 
(i.e. face mimicry) increases likeability and cooperation between two or more people, and 
that there is a lack of face mimicry for outgroup members. Theoretically these findings 
make sense in light of the function of the coalition mechanism. If the detecting and 
tracking of coalitions over evolutionary time were important when competing for 
resources, then being less cooperative with a competing coalition would be necessary for
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successful outcome.
Direct evidence of a cooperation “bias” based on coalitions can be found in the 
minimalist group paradigm created by Tajfel (1970). In this paradigm participants were 
randomly assigned to an arbitrary group and told to allocate resources to one group or the 
other. Also, participants were told that they would not personally receive any of the 
resources, but that they would simply be awarded to the team as a whole. In fact, 
participants allocated more resources to their own group, even when the group was 
arbitrary, novel, and they knew no one within the group (Tajfel, 1970).
In sum, race categorization appears to be a special case of coalition detection, in 
that the cognitive mechanisms that have evolved to detect and track coalitions are used to 
process race information. This is likely the case in cultures and societies where (1) 
patterns of cooperation (i.e. segregation) and (2) visual cues corresponding to these 
patterns (i.e. skin color) are present. However, regardless of whether the categorization is 
along the dimension of race, ethnicity, or shirt color, reliable biases in face mimicry, 
emotion recognition, memory, and attention reliably emerge (e.g., Dickter & Bartholow, 
2007; Mondillon et al., 2007; Kurzban et al., 2001). Each of these biases result from a 
cognitive mechanism that detects and tracks coalitions, suggesting that a more complete 
understanding of how this mechanism functions requires understanding its relationship to 
additional cognitive mechanisms.
In taking an evolutionary approach, the function of a cognitive mechanism is 
central, however, not every mechanism functions to directly produce a behavior. Instead 
many of these cognitive mechanisms store information as parameters to regulate
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additional cognitive mechanisms that do produce a behavioral output (Tooby, Cosmides, 
Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008). An example of this can be found in the sociometer 
theory of self-esteem (Kirkpatrick & Ellis, 2001). As such, the cognitive mechanism that 
detects and tracks coalition affiliations should either produce behavioral outputs, or 
regulate other mechanisms that do. Considering that behaviors are carried out through the 
rest of the body, the next section will explore the intricate relationship between the 
brain/mind and the body.
Embodiment
Although some cognitive mechanisms store parameters or summary magnitudes, 
they do so to integrate this information into the regulation of behavior (Tooby, Cosmides, 
Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008), in an attempt to move the body through the world in 
adaptive ways on average (Wilson, 2002; Grafton, Fadiga, Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997; 
Goodale & Milner, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992,1995). To be clear, “adaptive” in a 
biological sense is anything that enhances the survival and reproduction of an individual 
or the individual's genetic relatives (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Even though enhanced 
reproduction is the ultimate goal in natural selection, it typically cannot be achieved 
without meeting an array of proximate goals in the process (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).
To accomplish many of these goals, it is likely that an organism must move through its 
environment (i.e. foraging, avoiding predators, finding mates), but without computational 
machinery, the range of possible movements approaches infinity (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992). As a result, organisms without a brain typically do not move. For example, plants 
do not move, but instead attract insects that can move to successfully reproduce. One
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plant that does move, Dionaea muscipula or venus flytrap, utilizes action potentials to 
distinguish between an insect and a raindrop when deciding on closing its trap (Hodick & 
Sievers, 1987). In addition, the tunicate, or sea squirt, begins its life cycle with a cerebral 
ganglion allowing it to move through the ocean in search of a location to permanently 
attach itself. After it is attached, the tunicate digests its cerebral ganglion because it no 
longer needs to move (Towle & Towle, 1989). So, from a functional perspective, it makes 
little sense to study the brain/mind in isolation from the very body it attempts to control.
Embodied cognition is a view acknowledging that the brain/mind processes 
information from the body as well as the environment (e.g., Chambon, 2009). An 
example of embodied cognition is the feeling or sensation of hunger. When the stomach 
becomes empty the peptide ghrelin, which exists in high concentrations in the stomach, is 
released into the bloodstream. In turn, ghrelin stimulates the hypothalamus which sends 
signals to the anterior pituitary to inhibit the release of thyroid stimulating hormone 
(TSH) and adrenocorticotropic hormone (ACTH), two hormones that generate the feeling 
of being full, thus creating a state of hunger (Bear, Connors, & Paradiso, 2007) which 
likely activates cognitive mechanisms implicated in foraging behaviors (Bear, Connors,
& Paradiso, 2007; Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, $  Sznycer, 2008). Examples of 
embodied cognition go beyond such internal states as hunger, and are being discovered in 
areas such as perception (Proffitt, 2006), language (Glenberg, Sato, Cattaneo, Riggio, 
Palumbo, & Buccino, 2008), emotion (Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, &
Vermeulen, 2009), attitude formation (Cacioppo, Priester, Bemston, 1993) and empathy 
(Decety & Jackson, 2006).
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Perception. Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, and Epstein (2003) explored the effect that 
metabolic cost has on the perception of distances. Participants made estimates of 
distances to a variety of targets, with half of the participants wearing a heavy backpack, 
and the other half without a backpack. The participants that wore the heavy backpack 
estimated the distances to be significantly farther away than those without the backpack. 
Similar findings were found in the perception of slopes(Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). In both 
studies, the effect is described in terms of the “economy of action” (Proffitt, 2006) which 
suggests that the brain/mind receives inputs from the body regarding its current available 
energy, which regulates some of the computations being made by the cognitive 
mechanisms involved in perceiving spatial layout, in an attempt to guide behavior in an 
adaptive way.
Attitudes. Similar embodied effects have been discovered in the formation of 
attitudes. Gacioppo, Priester, and Bemtson (1993) had participants judge novel Chinese 
ideographs while flexing or extending their upper arm, By flexing the upper arm, a motor 
movement similar to pulling in towards the body is achieved, and extending the arm 
produces a movement similar to pushing away. As a result, participants rated the Chinese 
ideographs more favorably when they were simultaneously presented during arm flexion 
rather than arm extension. Similarly, Wells and Petty (1980) presented identical 
persuasive arguments to two groups of participants. Qne group of participants was 
instructed to move their head vertically while listening, and the other group was 
instructed to move their head horizontally. As expected', the participants who moved their 
heads vertically while listening to the message were more persuaded by the arguments
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than those engaged in the horizontal head movements. Similar findings were discovered 
with elderly stereotype primes and rate of walking, such that participants subliminally 
primed with words related to older people walked more slowly as a result (Bargh, Chen,
& Burrows, 1996). In each of these studies, the authors attempted to explain their results 
in terms of associations. However, a contemporary embodied and evolutionary approach 
suggests that these domain-specific cognitive mechanisms are sensitive to inputs from 
both the body and the environment, producing outputs (i.e., attitudes) reflecting the 
product of the inputs.
Emotions. Closely related to the previous discussion of the embodiment of 
attitudes, is the finding that emotions are also affected by bodily states. For example, 
Strack, Martin, & Stepper (1988) asked participants to hold a pen in their mouth, 
inadvertently contracting or relaxing the zygomaticus muscle, as they read and rated 
cartoons. Participants who were contracting their zygomaticus (i.e., smiling) rated the 
cartoons significantly more favorable. A wealth of empirical findings has also 
demonstrated that humans quickly and non-consciously mimic the facial expressions of 
others, in degrees corresponding to the perceived expression (e.g., Niedenthal, Barsalou, 
Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Francois, 2005). Furthermore, mimicking facial 
expressions has been shown to facilitate the categorization and detection of emotions 
(Niedentahl et al., 2005), as well as promote likeability (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) have demonstrated that humans mimic or imitate more 
than just facial expressions of others, but also postures and mannerisms, naming it the 
“Chameleon Effect”. These findings suggest that many facets of social cognition may be
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grounded in action, presumably relying on the somatosensory and motor cortex. Not 
surprisingly, clinical patients with damage to their somatosensory cortex show marked 
impairments in identifying emotional expressions (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & 
Damasio, 2000). Enticott, Johnston, Herring, Hoy, and Fitzgerald (2008) used 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over specific/areas of the motor cortex while 
participants viewed static images of facial expressions and patterns, demonstrating that 
activation in the motor cortex significantly correlated with face processing and 
mimicking, but had no relationship with the ability to recognize patterns. These findings, 
along with a myriad of others suggest a special case of embodiment called “embodied 
simulation” (Gallese, 2005).
Mirror Neurons. In 1992, di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, and Rizzolatti 
discovered a subset of motor neurons with unique properties. The researchers were taking 
single-cell recordings from the macaque motor cortex, in an attempt to map its functional 
organization. Surprisingly, a subset of motor neurons not only fired when the macaque 
performed an action, but also when the macaque observed the same action being 
performed by the experimenter. Furthermore, di Pellegrino et al. (1992) discovered that 
these neurons only discharged when observing goal directed actions, and they did not 
exhibit firing patterns consistent with a motor preparation, or “priming”, hypothesis 
(Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996).
Recently, Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, and Keenan (2007) reviewed the mirror neuron 
literature, explaining that in the macaque, mirror neurons are sensitive to the precise grip 
being used in the goal-directed action, and discharge when the macaque receives auditory
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input related to the action (i.e. seeing a peanut being cracked and hearing a peanut being 
cracked). In humans, single cell recordings of mirror neurons have not been obtained, but 
noninvasive neurophysiological evidence suggests that there exist neurons with similar, if 
not identical, functional properties as mirror neurons (Uddin et al., 2007). Essentially, 
“embodied simulation” is thought to be exemplified by mirror neurons, in that a 
perceived action is encoded by many of the same neurons that would be required to 
perform that action. What follows is a review of the EEG evidence for embodied 
simulation in humans, and how it relates to many of the nonverbal biases found in 
coalition processing.
Mu Rhythm. Electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings are thought to be a 
product of the electrical activity at the post-synaptic receptors in large populations of 
neurons. Within the EEG recordings, researchers may apply a variety of techniques to 
isolate the physiological activity thought to be associated with a particular cognitive 
process. One of the techniques used analyzes frequency oscillations in the brain. For 
example, the stages of sleep can be characterized by distinct frequency bands. In addition 
to the stages of sleep, recent research has revealed an interesting frequency band over the 
sensorimotor cortex that has similar functional properties as mirror neurons (Pineda, 
2005).
The mu rhythm is typically described as an 8-12 Hz frequency oscillation occurring 
over the sensorimotor cortex in nearly all healthy adults (Pineda, 2005). When the mu 
rhythm was originally discovered it was dismissed as an epiphenomenon, but as 
statistical and EEG techniques have improved it has received much more attention
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(Pineda, 2005). In short the mu rhythm is thought to reflect the synchronized firing of 
motor neurons in an “idling” state (Pfurtscheller & Neuper, 1994), but the interesting 
characteristic of the mu rhythm is that it becomes desynchronized when an individual 
makes a motor movement and when an individual perceives a motor movement (Pineda, 
2005). It is thought that the desynchronization occurs due to a subset of neurons in the 
motor cortex firing at a frequency outside of the 8-12 Hz range. Simply put, more 
desynchronization of the mu rhythm suggests more embodied simulation. With properties 
nearly identical to mirror neurons, many researchers suggest that the mu rhythm reflects 
mirror neuron activity, and have found empirical support implicating it in many social 
cognitive processes (Ulloa, & Pineda, 2007; Yang, Decety, Lee, Chen, & Cheng, 2009).
The desynchronization of the mu rhythm has been induced by viewing point-light 
biological motion versus scrambled point-light motion (Ulloa & Pineda, 2007), by 
performing and observing precision grasps (Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004), and 
by viewing images of others in pain (Yang, et al., 2009). Evidence with subdural 
electrodes has revealed that mu rhythm desynchronization corresponds to specific 
somatosensory regions within the cortex (i.e. face areas, hand areas) (Arroyo, Lesser, 
Gordon, Uematsu, Jackson, & Webber, 1993). In addition to the support for the mirror 
neuron hypothesis of the mu rhythm, other empirical investigations have revealed the mu 
rhythms involvement in a variety of social cognitive processes.
McFarland, Miner, Vaughan, and Wolpaw (2000) asked participants to perform and 
imagine performing bilateral hand movements. Both performing these movements and 
imagining performing them significantly desynchronized the mu rhythm. The authors
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report these findings in light of the potential usefulness in brain-computer interfaces, but 
these results have theoretical implications as well. For example, Yang et al. (2009) 
recorded the mu rhythm of individuals as they viewed images of hands in potentially 
painful and non-painful situations (e.g., scissor blades near one's fingers). As
i
hypothesized, there was significantly more mu desynchronization while participants 
viewed the painful images than non-painful images. Furthermore, Yang and colleagues
(2009) discovered that female participants had significantly more mu desynchronization 
than male participants which is compatible with the gender differences often found in 
empathic processing. These findings begin to suggest the role of the mu rhythm in 
empathy, yet direct evidence for its role in basic social interactions exists (Oberman, 
Pineda, & Ramachandran, 2007).
Oberman et al. (2007) varied levels of social interaction, in that participants viewed 
video clips of three individuals either (1) tossing a ball in the air to themselves, (2) 
tossing a ball to each other, and (3) tossing a ball to each other and towards the camera as 
if to include the participant. The researchers found that as the level of social interaction 
increased, the participants' mu rhythm became more desynchronized. In addition, Pineda 
and Hecht (2009) found that mu rhythm desynchronization positively correlated with the 
accuracy on an emotion matching task and a person-object interaction matching task, 
both of which tested subcomponents of the theory of mind. Based on these results, the 
authors concluded that the mu rhythm likely reflects the neural underpinnings involved in
i
linking perception and action, but not beliefs and intentions.
Finally, researchers have long marked the social impairments in those with Autism
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Spectrum Disorder (ASD), motivating studies implicating mirror neurons and the mu 
rhythm in particular. Oberman, Hubbard, McCleery, Altschuler, Ramachandran, and 
Pineda (2005) had healthy adults and age and IQ matched adults with ASD watch a video 
of a hand performing a series of gestures. The participants were asked to watch the videos 
and then perform those actions later as EEG was being recorded. The researcher 
discovered that although there were no differences in the mu rhythm desynchronization 
between healthy and ASD participants during the performance trials, there was- 
significantly more mu rhythm desynchronization for the healthy adults while perceiving 
others’ motor movements compared to those with ASD. Bernier, Dawson, Webb, and 
Murias (2007) found nearly the same results; however! they did discover that their sample 
of ASD participants scored significantly lower on a behavioral imitation task.
These investigations into the mu rhythm have demonstrated its importance in the 
successful imitation and mimicry of other individuals. Essentially, the mu rhythm is a 
biological reflection of the neuro-computations performed when an individual perceives 
an action with the intentions of producing a behavior congruent or compatible to it 
(Pineda, 2005).
The Current Research v
Imitation and face mimicry have been shown to be crucial antecedents to the 
recognition of emotions (Adolphs, Damasio, Tranel, Cooper, & Damasio, 2000; 
Niedenthal et al., 2005; Enticott, Johnston, Herring, Hoy, and Fitzgerald, 2008) as well as 
facilitate likeability and cooperation between individuals (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
Likewise, a number of studies have revealed that there exists emotion recognition and
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face mimicry biases during the processing of race qr coalition information, such that there 
tends to be less face mimicry, a lack of face recognition, and less cooperation when 
interacting with members of an outgroup (Weishbuch & Ambady, 2008; Brown, Bradley, 
& Lang, 2006; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004; Mondillon et al., 2007). This research 
seems to suggest that the coalition mechanism store parameters regarding an individual 
and regulates nonverbal behavior, such as face mimicry and imitation. This regulatory 
process is being discussed at the functional level of analysis, but as mentioned previously, 
these computations are physically instantiated in the neural tissue of the brain. The 
discovery of mirror neurons and subsequently the mu rhythm, seems to suggest the 
biological reflection of face mimicry and imitation (Pineda, 2005). If this is true, the mu 
rhythm should reflect the neuro-computations performed by the coalition mechanism to 
regulate an array of nonverbal behaviors. As such, the first study will test the hypothesis 
that the neuro-computations performed to process race information will store important 
parameters regarding a perceived individual, such that these parameters will regulate 
important nonverbal “biases” that are biologically reflected in the desynchronization of 
the mu rhythm. The second study will test a similar hypqthesis, but will assign 
participants to a novel group to test the prediction that the regulation of the nonverbal 
behaviors reflected in the mu rhythm, is sensitive to rapidly shifting coalition affiliations.
Study 1
The first study tested the hypothesis that the neuro-computations performed to 
process race information would regulate the desynchronization of the mu rhythm, such
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that perceiving goal-directed actions performed by racial ingroups would elicit 
significantly more desynchronization than racial outgroups. To test this, participants 
viewed videos depicting Black and White male hands performing goal-directed actions 
while the mu rhythm was recorded during the observation of the actions.
Method 
Participants
Twenty Introduction to Psychology students (13 Females, 7 males), with a mean 
age of 18.7 years, participated for course credit. All participants self-identified as White 
with no history of neurological illness. This study was reviewed and approved by the 
Institutional Review Board at the College of William &'Mary.
Materials
Three self-report questionnaires measured empathy, personal familiarity with and 
attitudes towards Blacks. First, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is 28-item 
measure of dispositional empathy containing four 5-point likert subscales of perspective 
taking (PT), empathic concern (EC), personal distress (PD), and a fantasy scale (FS) 
(Davis, 1983; see Appendix A).
Next, to assess participants’ familiarity with and contact with Blacks, a 14-item 
familiarity questionnaire was compiled from a familiarity measure (Greenwald, McGhee, 
& Schwartz, 1998), a social contact scale (Walker, SilvCrt, Hewstone, & Nobre, 2008), 
and an individuating experience scale (Walker et al., 2008). The familiarity measure is an 
unobtrusive measure used to record the average number of Black friends each participant 
has. The social contact scale measures general contact with Blacks. Finally, the
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individuating experience scale measures interpersonal or close contact with Blacks (see 
Appendix B).
Finally, the Attitudes Towards Blacks (ATB; Brigham, 1993) assessed racial 
prejudice. The ATB is a 20-item 7-point Likert-type scale measuring explicit racial 
prejudice (Brigham, 1993; see Appendix C).
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of 40 second (s) video clips depicting either a Black or White 
male right hand reaching for objects on a table. The actors recorded for the videos were 
volunteer college students recruited by a research assistant. None of the actors recorded 
had tattoos, markings, or jewelry on the arm used in the goal-directed actions. A total of 
four Black males, four White males, four Black females, and four White females were 
recruited and their hands recorded, however only three Black male and three White male 
hands were used in Study 1. Additionally, there were control clips that showed, for the 
same 40 s period only the objects on a table and only visual white noise. The condition 
with only the objects was used to'control for any low level visual properties of the 
objects, and to provide a baseline measure of mu rhythfn power for each participant.
Since the mu rhythm frequency range overlaps with tiiat of occipital alpha (8-12 Hz), the 
visual white noise helped control for this, and unlike the objects only condition, the white 
noise contained movement (Oberman et al., 2007). All videos were recorded in the same 
room with the same camera using QuickTime Movie to control for low level visual 
properties. Each video was cropped to achieve the dimensions of 960 X 540 and a length 
of 40 s. In addition, a separate sample of seven participants were asked to identify the
35
race of the hand in each video. All videos were correctly identified 98% of the time. All 
videos were 40 s in length and were shown twice to the participants, with the exception 
of the objects only and visual white noise being shown six times each. This length 
ensured that the same number of seconds of data would be analyzed as had been done 
previously (Oberman et al., 2007).
The objects used in the videos consisted of a black and white cup, a yellow foam 
ball, and a white board eraser. All objects were positioned in the same location on the 
table for each video. Furthermore, these same objects were recorded, without hand 
movements, as a baseline measure containing nearly identical visual properties with the 
exception of the Black of White hand. Each hand that was recorded grasped the objects as 
if they were going to use each object in an attempt to simulate a goal-directed action. The 
hands grasped and removed each object from the visual field in two different orders, then 
placed the objects back down in the visual field in the same locations in which they 
started. Therefore, the only difference between the Black and White hand videos was the 
race of the hand performing the actions.
Procedure
Participants completed the study individually in an electrically shielded EEG 
recording booth. When they arrived at the study, they read and signed the informed 
consent. Next, a White male researcher attached and tested the electrodes. EEG data were 
collected while participants viewed four different video conditions: (1) Visual White
' j
Noise (mean luminance 3.7 cd/m ), (2) Black male right hand grasping the objects, (3) 
White male right hand grasping the objects, and (4) the objects on a table. In the white
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noise, Black hand, and White hand conditions, each video would pause for 1.5 s 
randomly 1 -3 times during the 40 s period. To ensure .that the participants attended to the 
videos, they were told to count the number of times each video paused and to record this 
number after the video ended. After each video, participants were allowed time to record 
their responses and would press a key on a joystick to continue to the next video. Prior to 
each video was a 5 s baseline period with a grey screen. Participants were shown six 
videos representing each condition in random order. The Black and White hand videos 
consisted of three different Black or White hands respectively, but each hand was shown 
twice for a total of six videos.
After the participants finished viewing the videos, they were asked to record what 
they thought was the purpose of the experiment. Next, the experimenter came in to the 
EEG booth with the four objects that were previously shown in the videos (i.e., cup, ball, 
and eraser). The participants proceeded to grasp each object continuously for 100 s, in a 
manner similar to each video, but were told that they did not have to imitate the 
previously shown actions. This participant grasping procedure was initially intended to 
serve as an additional baseline, in that it should demonstrate the full desynchronization of 
the mu rhythm. However, this condition was not analyzed considering that the white 
noise and objects only conditions provided a sufficient baseline measure. Finally, the IRI, 
familiarity, and ATB scales were administered on paper, one at a time respectively, and 
then the participants were debriefed.
Electroencephalography
Electrophysiological data were recorded continuously at 2000 samples per second
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using a DBPA-1 Sensorium bio-amplifier (Sensorium Inc., Charlotte, VT) with an analog 
high-pass filter of 0.01 Hz and a low-pass filter of 500 Hz (four-pole Bessel). Recordings 
were made using an extended 10-20 cap system with 72 Ag-AgCl sintered electrodes 
while participants were seated in an electrically shielded booth. EEG recordings were 
made using a forehead ground electrode and a reference at the tip of the nose. Vertical 
and horizontal eye movement was recorded from peri-occular electrodes placed on the 
superior and inferior orbits (centered with the pupil) said from electrodes placed at the 
lateral canthi respectively. All impedances were adjusted to within 0-20 kilohms at the 
start of the recording session.
EEG data were undersampled at 500 Hz and analyzed off-line using EMSE 
(Source Signal Imaging, San Diego, CA). Individual channels were then analyzed in 
, one-second sweeps over the entire recording epoch. Channels containing extreme values 
(+/- 300 pV) in more than 40% of the sweeps were replaced by interpolation (spherical 
spline). Additionally, sweeps in which more than 20 (28%) of the channels were 
contaminated by such artifact were removed from the analysis. The data were corrected 
for ocular artifact using independent components analysis (Jung, Makeig, Humphries,
Lee, McKeown, Sejnowki, 2000), low-pass filtered at 20 Hz.
EEG data were collected for approximately 240 s per condition, however, since the 
8-12 Hz frequency range of the p rhythm overlaps with the occipital alpha band, the first 
and last 10 s of each video were excluded from analysis to eliminate possible attentional 
transients due to initiation and termination of the stimulus (Oberman et al., 2007). This 
resulted in a total of 120 s of EEG data to be analyzed per condition. In addition, data
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were recorded over the entire scalp, but since the p rhythm occurs over the sensorimotor 
cortex only data from electrodes C3, Cz, and C4 were analyzed.
Data were segmented offline into epochs of 2 s beginning at the start of each 20 s 
segment within each video. Fast Fourier transformations were performed on each 2 s 
epoch to obtain the power of each frequency. A harming cosine window was used to 
control for artifacts resulting from data splicing. Then, the 2 s epoch power values in the 
8-12 Hz frequency range were averaged across videos within each condition. The mu 
desynchronization was calculated by taking the ratio of the power values in the 8-12 Hz 
frequency range for each condition relative to the power values in the 8-12 Hz frequency 
range for the objects only condition. Natural logarithmic transformations were performed 
on each ratio score because of the inherent non-normality of ratio data (Oberman et al., 
2007) . This resulted in a total of three log ratio scores for each participant, representing 
mu power relative to baseline for the Black hand, Wfyite hand, and white noise 
conditions.
Results 
Behavioral Performance
One participant was excluded due to being left-handed, and one more participant 
was excluded due to data processing issues. The remaining eighteen participants all self­
identified as being White (12 Females, 6 males), with & mean age of 18.74 years, were 
right-handed, and reported having no history of a neurological illness. The average 
accuracy score on the continuous performance task was 97% (SD=0.04), therefore, 
potential differences in mu desynchronization were most likely not due to differences in
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attention.
Mu Desynchronization
Prior to running the analysis on the log of the ratio data, the cleaned EEG data from 
each participant were segmented such that the onset and offset of each video was spliced 
together. An independent components analysis (ICA) revealed a signal with an increase in 
8-12 Hz activity that was distributed on the scalp over the sensorimotor cortex. This 
suggested that a subcomponent within the entire EEG signal was similar to the mu 
rhythm.
The log of the ratio scores indicative of mu desynchronization for each condition 
were subjected to a repeated-measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with three levels 
corresponding to each condition (White hand, Black hand, Visual white noise). Results 
indicated a significant effect of condition, F(2, 34) = 3.63, p  < 0.05, r|2p = 0.19 (see 
Figure 1; Greenhouse-Geisser degrees of freedom reported). To confirm that goal-
directed actions elicited significantly more mu desynchronization than visual white noise,
\
a planned contrast compared the weighted average of lie  Black and White hand 
conditions (M=-0.14, Sis=0.04) with the visual white noise condition (M=-0.05, 
Sis=0.06), revealing significantly more mu desynchronization for goal-directed actions, 
t(\l)=226, j9=0.038, r2=0.45. A planned contrast testing the a priori hypothesis that 
White hands (M=-0.15, SE=0.05) would elicit more mu desynchronization than Black 
hands (M=-0.14, SZs=0.04) revealed no significant difference, i(17)=-0.39,/?=0.70. 
Individual Differences
Means and standard deviations of each subscale itised are reported in Table 1. To
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examine potential relationships between mu desynchronization and empathy, familiarity, 
or racial prejudice, a “mu bias” score was correlated with each questionnaire or 
subscales. The “mu bias” score for each participant was computed by subtracting the 
White hand condition from the Black hand condition. Therefore, larger positive scores 
indicate more mu desynchronization for the White hand condition relative to the Black 
hand condition (M= 0.012, SD=0.13). Eight females (66%) and three males (43%) 
demonstrated more mu desynchronization for the White relative to Black condition. The 
only relationship that emerged was a positive correlation between mu bias and the IRI 
fantasy subscale, r(16)=0.54,/>=0.02 (see Table 2).
Discussion
This study examined whether White participants, when processing race 
information, would show less mu rhythm desynchronisation to racial outgroup versus 
racial ingroup members, presumably indicating less mirror neuron activity or embodied 
simulation. The results indicated that there was no significant difference when perceiving 
White or Black hands. There was, however, significant mu desynchronization for both the 
White and Black hands in comparison to the visual white noise indicating that the neuro­
computations being performed while participants viewed goal-directed actions did, at 
least in part, involve the sensori-motor cortex.
The fact that there were no significant differences between White and Black hands 
in the desynchronization of the mu rhythm suggests that the cognitive mechanisms 
designed to detect and track coalitions, in this case race, do not regulate the mu rhythm. 
With the previous investigations of the mu rhythm demonstrating its sensitivity to
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computations related to imitation (Oberman et al., 2005), empathy (Yang et al., 2009), 
and theory of mind (Pineda & Hecht, 2009) it is puzzling not to discover significant 
differences in mu desynchronization between racial ingroups and outgroups. Especially 
considering the wealth of literature finding reliable race or coalition biases in face 
recognition (Weishbuch & Ambady, 2008; Brown et al., 2006), and emotion recognition 
(Mondillon et al., 2007; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004), each of which have been 
shown to require imitation and mimicry (Mondillon et al., 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2005).
First, it should be mentioned that data from only 18 participants were collected. 
Although other investigations of the mu rhythm repotted sample sizes of 23 (Pineda & 
Hecht, 2008), 20 (Oberman et al., 2006), and 16 (Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson,
2004), it may be that the particular effect tested in this study requires a larger sample, due 
to potential moderating variables.
One possibility is that, in this particular sample, information regarding one's race 
did not serve as visual cues corresponding to coalitions. However, considering that during 
the pilot testing of each video, a separate sample was able to correctly identify the race of 
each hand, and that a number of studies have found th .^t people quickly and effortlessly 
categorize race based on visually prominent cues (Fiske, et al., 1999), it seems logical to 
suggest that participants likely implicitly categorized race. However, this study was not 
capable of ensuring that participants were implicitly categorizing race.
If participants were in fact categorizing race, it m^y be that this distinction was not 
salient enough to elicit differences in the mu rhythm. For example, if the mu rhythm 
reflects processes related to imitation (Oberman et al., 2005), and imitation improves
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likeability and cooperation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), it may be that the computational 
machinery that detects and tracks coalitions will only regulate the mu rhythm when the 
context involves cooperation and competition.
Finally, results revealed a significant relationship'between the differential mu 
desynchronization between the White and Black hand conditions and the fantasy subscale 
in the IRI questionnaire. There were no a priori hypotheses regarding this specific 
relationship, however, previous research has demonstrated an opposing relationship 
between mu desynchronization and empathy, specifically the IRI questionnaire (Yang, et 
al., 2009), making this relationship all the more puzzling.
Before addressing larger issues and limitations concerning the functioning of the 
mu rhythm, the limitations previously mentioned will be addressed in the second study; 
the original hypothesis will be tested.
Study 2
The original aim of the second study was to test the hypothesis that the cognitive 
mechanism designed to detect and track coalitions will regulate the mu rhythm, even as 
coalitions rapidly change. However, since the first study did not support the regulation of 
the mu rhythm by the coalition neuro-computation machinery, the second study served to 
address the limitations of the first study. As such, the two limitations that were addressed 
were whether the visual cues indicative of the coalitions were salient, and whether 
cooperation and competition were necessary contextuaFfactors. Thus, this study was 
nearly identical to the first study, except that participants were randomly assigned to a 
novel group. A minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970) was used to create a new
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coalition, which was represented by a certain color on a wrist band. After being told that 
they were a member of one of the novel coalitions, participants viewed the same goal- 
directed actions as in Study 1, the only difference being that these hands were wearing a 
wrist band indicating which coalition they belonged to. Finally, participants were told that 
they were competing against the opposing team for a monetary reward, in order to 
increase the salience of the ingroup and outgroup coalitions.
Participants
Thirty-two Introduction to Psychology students (9 Females, 23 Males) with a mean 
age of 19.1 years participated for course credit. All participants self-identified as being 
White and having no history of neurological illness. This study was reviewed and 
approved by the Institutional Review Board at the College of William & Mary.
Materials and Stimuli
The IRI, familiarity, and ATB questionnaires were identical to those used in Study 
1. Additionally, the same four objects used in Study 1, (i.e., Black cup, White cup, 
yellow foam ball, and dry-erase eraser) were again used tp create new videos and were 
grasped by the participants. Videos nearly identical to the videos in the first study were 
used. The only difference between the videos in Study 2 and those in Study 1 was that the 
actors performed the goal-directed actions wearing a red wrist band, and then with a blue 
wrist band. All videos were recorded with the same camera using QuickTime Movies and 
cropped to achieve dimensions of 960 X 540 and a 40 s length. These videos were also 
pilot-tested for race and wrist band color identification and clarity. Additional materials
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were used in the coalition and minimalist group manipulation and will be discussed in 
that section.
Manipulation
The procedure of the second study was similar to the first study with the addition of 
the coalition and minimalist group manipulation. First, participants entered the 
electrically shielded EEG both, read and signed an informed consent. Next, participants 
were told that they would take part in a “Dot Estimation Task” to determine their 
perceptual bias. Instructions were:
Perceptual estimation has been linked to an ability to detect subtle changes in 
motion perception. In this task you will view a series of slides depicting an array of 
dots. Each slide will be presented for 1.5 seconds and you will have to estimate 
how many dots were displayed after each slide. You will not be able to precisely 
count the number of dots, so please do your best to estimate the number. After each 
slide you will be given as much time as you need to record your answer. When you 
are ready to view the next slide, press the down &d*ow. After you have finished 
estimating all ten slides please wait for more instructions from the experimenter.
For this task, participants viewed ten slides with a random display of approximately 
30-80 dots, one at a time for 1.5 seconds. After each slide the participants recorded the 
number of dots they perceived on the slide. At the end of the “Dot Estimation Task”, the 
experimenter took the answer sheet used by the participant, left the room for a few 
minutes as if to record their answers, and came back with a “Results” sheet telling the 
participant whether they were a “Perceptual Over Estimator” or “Perceptual Under
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Estimator” which was counterbalanced between participants. The “Results” sheet was 
bogus feedback designed to provide a legitimate assignment to one of the two groups (i.e. 
red or blue team). This manipulation was derived from Tajfel’s (1970) minimalist group 
paradigm.
It was explained to the participant that this has been linked to motion perception, 
and that is precisely what the study was testing. Furthermore, the participant was 
provided either a red or blue wrist band (counterbalanced between participants and 
perceptual bias group). Then the participants were told that they would view a series of 
videos in which the videos would randomly pause for 1.5 s, and their task was to count 
and record the number of pauses per video. Participants were informed that their 
performance on this task was important because their accuracy score would be averaged 
with their team’s average accuracy (their team being their wrist band color), and the team 
with the highest average accuracy would determine how a monetary reward would be 
allocated between teams.
Video Conditions
As mentioned earlier, these videos were nearly identical to the first study, with the 
exception that half of the Black hands wore a red wrist band and the other half wore a 
blue wrist band; the same was true for the White hands: In other words, the wrist bands 
were orthogonal to race, resembling previous manipulations of coalition (Kurzban et al., 
2001). There were an equal number of Black hand and White hand videos for each the 
red and blue wrist band teams, leading to total of four videos each shown twice per each 
of the four conditions. Thus, the four experimental conditions were as follows: (1) Black
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with a red wrist band, (2) Black with a blue wrist band, (3) White with a red wrist band, 
and (4) White with a blue wrist band. However, the hypothesis was concerned with 
coalitions based on wrist bands, and since wrist bands were counterbalanced between 
participants, these conditions had to be reorganized in accordance with the participant's 
wrist band color. As such four new conditions were formed: (1) Black ingroup wrist band, 
(2) Black outgroup wrist band, (3) White ingroup wrist band, and (4) White outgroup 
wrist band. Additionally, the two control conditions in c ite d  trials involving the visual 
white noise and the object only conditions, which were simply averaged over trials for 
each participant for the analyses below. After the objects only condition was divided out 
of each condition, five conditions remained.
Resource Allocation
After the participants watched each video, they were asked to provide their contact 
information, so the experimenter could contact them regarding which team achieved the 
highest accuracy rate. Next, the participants were asked to allocate a $200 prize between 
their own team and the opposing team, based on the wrist band color. This is identical to 
the minimalist group paradigm created by Tajfel (197Q), and was used to determine a 
measurement of coalition resource allocation.
After the resource allocation task, participants were asked to record what they 
thought the experiment was measuring, and then completed each of the three 
questionnaires. Finally, the participants were debriefed and dismissed. 
Electroencephalography
The EEG data were recorded while the participants viewed each video. The entire
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data collection, processing, and cleaning were identical to the first study. In addition, the 
data were segmented into 2 s epochs and Fast Fourier transforms were performed over 
each of these. Again, a ratio was calculated between each condition and the objects only 
condition, then a natural logarithmic transform was performed to correct for non­
normality.
Results 
Behavioral Performance
One male participant was excluded due to a suspected neurological impairment. 
Another male participant was excluded due to being left-handed, and one male 
participant was excluded due to data processing issues. The remaining twenty-nine 
participants all self-identified as being White (9 Females, 20 males), with a mean age of 
19.13 years, were right-handed, and reported having no history of a neurological illness. 
The average accuracy score on the continuous performance task was 90% (SD=0.14), 
therefore, difference in mu desynchronization were most likely not due to differences in 
attention.
Mu Desynchronization
The log of the ratio scores indicative of mu desynchronization for each condition 
were subjected to a repeated-measures ANOVA with five levels corresponding to each 
condition. A Greenhouse-Geisser correction revealed a significant effect of condition,
F(4, 112) = 2.99, p  < 0.05, r|2p = 0.10 (see Figure 3). Next, a 2(Race) X 2(Wrist Band 
Group) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted, revealing no significant main effects 
or interaction. This test was conducted to primarily test the interaction, since the planned
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contrasts tested the main effects (see below).
To confirm that goal-directed actions elicited significantly more mu 
desynchronization than visual white noise, a planned contrast compared the weighted 
average of the Black ingroup, Black outgroup, White ingroup, and White outgroup hand 
conditions (M=-0.17, ££=0.04) with the visual white noise condition (M=-0.05, 
££=0.05), revealing significantly more mu desynchronization for goal-directed actions, 
f(28)=-2.24, £>=0.033, r =0.05. A planned contrast testing the a priori hypothesis that 
ingroup hands (M=-0.19, ££=0.04) would elicit more mu desynchronization than 
outgroup hands (M=-0.15, ££=0.04) revealed no significant difference,7(28)=-1.23, 
/?=0.23. To rule out the hypothesis that White hands (M=-0.17, ££=0.04) would elicit 
more mu desynchronization than Black hands (M=-0.16, ££=0.04), a final planned 
contrast averaging over wrist band group revealed no significant difference, r(28)=0.29, 
£>=0.77.
Individual Differences
All means and standard deviations for each subscale are reported in Table 3. To 
examine any relationship between empathy, familiarity, or racial prejudice, a “mu group 
bias” score was correlated with each questionnaire or subscales. The “mu group bias” 
score for each participant was computed by subtracting the ingroup hand conditions from 
the outgroup hand conditions. Therefore, larger scores indicate more mu 
desynchronization for the ingroup hand conditions relative to the outgroup hand 
conditions (M= 101, ££=87.4). Four females (44%) and ten males (50%) showed more 
mu desynchronization in the ingroup relative to outgroup condition. In addition, a
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resource allocation bias score was computed for each participant by subtracting the 
amount of money they allocated to the opposing team from the amount they allocated to 
their own team (M= 101, SD=81A). Therefore larger scores were indicative of a larger 
resource allocation bias. Five females (56%) and thirteen males (65%) allocated more 
money to their own group than the opposing group.
First, a significant negative correlation was found between resource allocation bias 
and the empathic concern subscale on the IRI, r(27)=-Q.37,/>=0.046 suggesting that more 
empathy was associated with less bias in resource allocation. Next, the ATB positively 
correlated with the mu group bias r(27)=0.43,p=0.02 and negatively correlated with the 
allocation bias r(27)=-0.52, /?=0.004 indicating that lower self-reported prejudice was 
associated with more mu desynchronization differences between groups and less bias in 
resource allocation, respectively. Lastly, the ATB positively correlated with the familiarity 
subscale of interpersonal experience r(27)=0.41,p=0.G3, and the IRI subscales of 
empathic concern r(27)=0.60,/>=0.001, fantasy score r(27)=0.52,/7=0.004, and 
perspective taking r(27)=0.44,/?=0.02 suggesting that lower self-reported prejudice was 
associated with higher levels of interpersonal reactivity (see Table 4).
Discussion
Study 2 was initially conducted to test the hypothesis that any regulation of the mu 
rhythm by the coalition detecting and tracking mechanisms was flexible during the 
establishment of novel coalitions. The results failed to'support this hypothesis. Given that 
the coalition mechanism did not regulate the mu rhythm when coalitions were based on 
race in Study 1, it is not surprising that coalitions basedlon another visually prominent
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feature would be any different.
Based on Study 1, the second study was capably of addressing some limitations of 
the first study. Study 1 was limited in confirming that the participants could detect the 
race of each hand without being asked explicitly to make that distinction. However, in 
Study 2 it was made explicit to the participants that they were competing with those that 
were wearing the opposing color wrist band. Next, Study 1 did not involve any 
competition, which may be an important input in the regulation of the mu rhythm. In fact, 
the second study demonstrated that even when participants were made aware of their 
group membership in relation to the hands performing actions, and when competition is 
introduced, the mu rhythm is still not regulated by the Coalition detecting and tracking 
mechanism.
Additional findings involve a negative correlation between empathic concern and 
the allocation bias. This suggests that those participants with higher self-reports of 
empathy showed less of a bias in allocating resources to an opposing coalition. Next, the 
ATB, often considered a measure of self-reported prejudice towards Blacks positively 
correlated with the IRI subscales of empathic concern, fantasy scale, and perspective 
taking. This finding was not hypothesized, but it certainly makes sense that the more an 
individual is able to imagine being in another person’s position, the less prejudice they 
would have, regardless of the outgroup (Galinksy & Moskowitz, 2002). Next, a positive 
correlation was found between the ATB and the mu group bias. This would suggest that 
the less self-reported prejudice, mu desynchronization for the ingroup was larger relative 
to the outgroup. This certainly was not hypothesized, rather a negative correlation would
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be expected based on the theoretical information motivating the study. Finally, the ATB 
and resource allocation bias were found to be negatively correlated. There was not a clear 
hypothesis regarding the relationship between the ATB and allocation biases. However, it 
could be that the ATB was reflecting, at least in part, attitudes of group equality (Brodish, 
Brazy, & Devine, 2008). In sum, neither hypothesis was confirmed, yet additional 
limitations, future directions, and a re-examination of the functional properties of the mu 
rhythm are in order.
General Discussion
Research has discovered that humans are often slower to recognize the face and 
emotional expressions of their racial outgroups (e.g., Hugenburg & Bodenhausen, 2004). 
Additional findings suggest that this effect holds true for any outgroup (Weisbuch & 
Ambady, 2008; Brown et al., 2006) or coalition (Kurzban et al., 2001; Mondillon et al., 
2007). Adolphs et al. (2000), Enticott et al. (2008), and Niedenthal et al. (2005) In fact, a 
necessary antecedent to recognizing facial expressions is the automatic and often subtle 
mimicking of the expression by the perceiver (Adolphs et al., 2000; Enticott et al., 2008; 
Niedenthal et al., 2005) which increases likeability and cooperation (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Van Baaren et al., 2004) even in virtual environments 
(Bailenson & Yee, 2005). Despite this wealth of research, a causal link between the 
cognitive mechanism that detects and tracks coalitions nnd the cognitive mechanisms that 
produce imitation and face mimicry is missing. A likely candidate is reflected in the 
psychophysiological phenomenon called the mu rhythm, considering it has been 
implicated in imitation (Qberman et al., 2005; Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004),
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increased social interaction (Oberman et al., 2007), and empathy for pain (Yang et al., 
2009). The goal of the current research was to provide evidence demonstrating that the 
cognitive mechanisms that detect and track coalitions.! store parameters regarding a 
perceived individual that regulate the mu rhythm, which in turn has the ability to alter 
face mimicry, imitation, likeability, and cooperation.
In Study 1, White participants viewed goal-directed actions performed by Black 
and White male hands while EEG recorded their mu rhythm desynchronization. The 
results revealed that there was no significant difference in mu rhythm desynchronization 
based on race, suggesting that the coalition mechanism underlying race categorization did 
not regulate the mu rhythm. One limitation from this study is that it was not made explicit 
That the hands represented racial ingroups and outgroups. Moreover, this initial study did 
not involve the participants in a competitive situation between groups, a potentially 
important factor considering the role of imitation in cooperation and resource allocation 
(Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).
The second study attempted to address these limitations while simultaneously 
testing the initial hypothesis again. In Study 2, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two teams based on the minimalist group paradigm (Tajefel, 1970) and the 
coalition manipulation (Kurzban et al., 2001). Participants viewed goal-directed actions 
performed by individuals on their team or on their opposing team, both of which 
contained an equal number of White and Black hands. Participants were explicitly told 
that they were competing against the opposing team for a monetary reward. The results 
indicated that the coalition mechanism did not regulate the mu rhythm, even when the
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coalitions are made explicit and a competitive scenario was established.
Methodological Limitations
The first methodological limitation in both studies was the small sample size and 
the uneven distribution of male and female participants. In the first study only eighteen 
participants' data were analyzed. Of the eighteen participants twelve were female and 
seven were male. In the second study data were analyzed from twenty-nine participants, 
however, nine were females and twenty were males. In the first study, a larger sample 
size would likely reduce the variability, but in terms of EEG research, this is a typical 
sample size. The most important concern with both sample sizes was that participant sex 
differences could not be examined. In fact, Yang et al. (2009) found significantly more 
mu desynchronization for female participants when viewing a hand in a painful situation, 
and other research has discovered that males tend to show more explicit race biases, 
exhibit larger biases in resource allocation, and aggress more towards outgroups than 
females (Navarrete, McDonald, Molin, & Sidanius, 2010). These results suggest that if 
there is regulation of the mu rhythm by a coalition mechanism, male participants may 
show a more pronounced effect than female participants.
A second limitation specific to the second study is concerned with the group 
manipulation. Participants were arbitrarily assigned to either the red or blue team based 
on a fictitious perceptual task, and told they would compete with the opposing team to 
determine how to allocate a $200 prize. First, it is possible that this manipulation did not 
provide enough of the inputs necessary to generate a sense of belonging to one group. 
Second, the $200 prize may not have been large enough to provide a competitive context.
Third, the participants were told they would merely decide how the prize would be 
allocated between the two teams, not to themselves personally. Although these are 
possible limitations, the procedure of this study followed Tajfel's (1970) minimalist group 
paradigm which has demonstrated in multiple studies t|iat simply placing participants in 
one group and having them allocate resources to the team, not the individual, is enough to 
elicit group biases.
The last methodological limitation is concerned with demonstrating a causal link. 
Although these studies failed to demonstrate the regulation of the mu rhythm by the 
coalition mechanism, if it had, there were not any measures of imitation or mimicry. The 
only behavioral measure existed in Study 2 as the differential allocation of resources, yet 
it has not been demonstrated that the mu rhythm is a necessary antecedent to this 
particular behavior. Although other researchers have discovered a causal role for mu 
rhythm desynchronization and imitation (Oberman et al., 2005), it is not clear if the 
parameters stored by the coalition mechanism would regulate the mu rhythm such that 
imitation would be affected. Future investigations should take this in to consideration by 
designing experiments in which imitation or face mimicry behavior can be measured 
while simultaneously recording mu rhythm desynchronization. For example, a study 
using facial electromyography (EMG) to measure facial muscle movement coupled with 
EEG would allow for such a test.
Theoretical Concerns
An important theoretical question that the current studies highlights is whether 
visual cues derived solely from an arm and hand of an individual are enough to engage
55
the coalition mechanism. The majority of research on race-related biases has used face 
stimuli (e.g., Dickter & Bartholow, 2007); although the consensus in the scientific 
community is that any visually prominent feature should elicit the categorization by race 
(Fiske et al., 1999) or coalition (Kurzban et al., 2001). 'In fact, pilot tests revealed that 
perceivers were easily able to categorize the race of the actors through visual inspection 
of their hands in the videos, although it is unknown whether this categorization occurred 
unprompted in the two studies reported here.
Similarly, the participants viewed hands performing goal-directed actions, but these 
actions were not necessarily related to the competition : This raises an important concern 
regarding the mu rhythm. It is typically suggested thaii'the mu rhythm is only sensitive to 
goal-directed actions (Ulloa & Pineda, 2007), yet the specific goal of an action in 
conjunction with the current context has not been studied. It is possible that if the 
coalition mechanism were to regulate the mu rhythm, if would do so in a functionally 
meaningful way, such that only actions that are relevant to the relationship between the 
established coalitions would have an effect. Perhaps in a competitive context, only goal- 
directed actions indicative of cooperation would elicit more mu rhythm 
desynchronization. Theoretical support for this notion would come from the domain- 
specific view of the brain/mind that comprises one of ih§ major principles of an 
evolutionary psychology approach.
The next theoretical concern shifts the focus to the coalition mechanism. Kurzban 
et al. (2001) demonstrated that by correlating shared visual cues and cues of allegiance, 
conceptualizations of coalitions were maximized. Similarly, Tajfel's (1970) minimal
56
group paradigm has shown the least amount of input required to generate a 
conceptualization of a coalition. It seems quite plausible that additional functionally 
relevant variables (e.g. competition for resources, threat of bodily harm) would regulate 
the conceptualization of a coalition appropriately. Forvcxample, imagine the coalitions 
formed when two athletic teams compete in comparison to the coalitions formed by 
ethnic groups in various regions of the world. Even within athletics the difference in the 
coalitions formed when two “rivals” compete appears, anecdotally anyway, much 
stronger than non-rivals. This suggests an additional avenue of research investigating 
moderating input variables during coalition formation. With respect to the mu rhythm, it 
is possible that only moderate to strong coalition affiliations are capable of regulating its 
desynchronization.
Lastly, the results from these studies encourage a re-examination of the function of 
the mu rhythm. Pineda (2005) has suggested that the mu rhythm functions as an action 
observation/execution matching system, or as translating “seeing” or “hearing” into 
“doing”. In other words, Pineda (2005) suggests that the mu rhythm functions as the 
center of embodied simulation. However accurate Pineda's (2005) “functional” 
explanation for the mu rhythm, it is merely a description, and a general one at that. It 
does not serve to guide specific hypotheses, and the hypotheses that are derived from this 
explanation can simply be derived from the embodied cognition literature as a whole. In 
addition, Pineda (2005) does more to describe the mu rhythm than to actually explain its 
function. From an evolutionary approach, the “functioning” of a mechanism is “the 
problem it solved -- the consequences it had — that caused the propagation of its genetic
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basis relative to that of alternative mechanisms” (Ermer et al., 2007, p. 153). Following 
this definition, it is not clear precisely what problem an action observation/execution 
matching system would solve. Indeed, such a system would solve many problems, 
making it a too general from a computational standpoint to be considered an adaptation. 
This would leave the understanding of the mu rhythm to be just as ambiguous and 
unpredictable without Pineda's (2005) definition. Before future research investigates what 
variables influence the desynchronization of the mu rhythm, a comprehensive and 
evolutionarily informed functional analysis should be conducted.
As a proposed alternative to Pineda's (2005) conceptualization of the mu rhythm, it 
seems plausible that the mu rhythm simply reflects a feature that any number of domain- 
specific, content-dependent cognitive mechanisms possess. In comparison to this 
conceptualization, consider what problem attention or memory solved over evolutionary 
time. It is likely that attention and memory both solved many problems (i.e. attending to 
threats, faces, cues regarding mate value, etc.). Likewise, many domain-specific cognitive 
mechanisms would only be able to solve their own specific adaptive problem if they had 
the features of attention and memory. For example, the cognitive mechanisms that detect 
cheaters initially use conditional logic to detect a cheater (Cosmides, 1989). However, 
what use is detecting whether another person is going to take your resources if you 
cannot remember this person at a later date? Research on this topic has in fact revealed 
that humans find cheaters more important to remember than cooperators, and even more 
so when there is a greater amount of resources at stake (Chiappe, 2004). Behaviorally, 
humans look longer and have enhanced memory for faces of individuals that had
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previously cheated (Chiappe, 2004). From a broader perspective, memories are often 
stored in the sensory modality in which the initial information acquired (i.e. remembering 
sounds in auditory cortex; Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003) suggesting that 
memory is a feature of other mechanisms, not an adaptation in and of itself. In the same 
way that memory may be a feature of many domain-sjpecific content-dependent cognitive 
mechanisms shaped by natural selection to solve recurring adaptive problems, so too are 
the neuro-computations generating the mu rhythm. Instead of storing information for 
future use (e.g. memory), the neuro-computations generating the mu rhythm are 
converting the stored parameters from various cognitive mechanisms to move the body 
through the world in adaptive ways on average. This conceptualization of the mu rhythm 
would inherently encapsulate the embodied view of the brain/mind from an 
evolutionarily informed perspective, yielding more predictability, driving hypothesis 
testing.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the hypothesis that the cognitive mechanism responsible for 
detecting and tracking coalitions would regulate the neuro-computations reflected in the 
mu rhythm was not supported. These results do question the current conceptualization of 
the mu rhythm, suggesting that future research may benefit by employing more 
evolutionarily rigorous standards in determining its function. Additionally, research 
investigating the coalition mechanism may benefit from considering moderating variables 
that may alter the strength of a perceived coalition. Lastly, by combining both an 
evolutionary framework with an embodied view of the brain/mind, a causal link between
59
person perception and intergroup conflict may eventually be revealed.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Self-report Measures in Study 1.
M SD
Number of Friends 0.06 0.11
Social Contact 3.08 1.4
Interpersonal Experience 3.31 0.7
Attitudes Towards Blacks 5.81 0.75
Empathic Concern 3.791 0.61
Fantasy Scale 3.69 0.8
Personal Distress 2.51 0.65
Perspective Taking 3.72 0.75
Note. N= 18
Means and standard deviations for each subscale. Number of Friends, Social Contact, and 
Interpersonal Experience are subscales from the familiarity questionnaire. Empathic 
Concern, Fantasy Scale, Personal Distress, and Perspective Taking are subscales from the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).
Table 2. Table of Correlations for Study 1.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 Mu Rhythm Bias
2 Number of Friends -0.21
3 Social Contact -0.21 -0.04
4
Interpersonal
Experience -0.23 0.23 0.17
5
Attitudes Towards 
Blacks -0.09 0.22 0.35 0.27
6 Empathic Concern 0.18 -0.07 0.20 -0.12 0.48*
7 Fantasy Scale 0.54* -0.23 0.08 -0.20 0.05 0.40
8 Personal Distress -0.13 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.26 0.39 -0.08
9 Perspective Taking -0.14 -0.09 -0.07 0.00 -0.08 0.12 -0.03 0.13
Note. * = P < 0.05, n= 18
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Self-report Measures in Study 2.
M SD
Number of Friends 0.04 0.06
Social Contact 3.44 0.88
Interpersonal Experience 2.95 0.84
Attitudes Towards Blacks 5.76 0.79
Empathic Concern 3.68 0.61
Fantasy Scale 3.55 0.89
Personal Distress 2.41 0.62
Perspective Taking 3.48 0.81
Note. N=\%
Means and standard deviations for each subscale. Nurtfber of Friends, Social Contact, and 
Interpersonal Experience are subscales from the familiarity questionnaire. Empathic 
Concern, Fantasy Scale, Personal Distress, and Perspective Taking are subscales from the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).
Table 4. Table of Correlations For Study 2.
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1_________ 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 Mu Group Bias
2 Allocation Bias -0.04
3 Number of Friends 0.20 -0.25
4 Social Contact -0.02 -0.31 0.38*
5
Interpersonal
Experience 0.19 -0.21 0.50** 0.54**
6
Attitudes Towards 
Blacks 0.43* -0.52** 0.24 0.22 0.41*
7 Empathic Concern 0.37* -0.37* 0.26 0.16 035 0.60**
8 Fantasy Scale 0.20 -0.33 -0.05 -0.14 0.08 0.52** 0.36
9 Personal Distress -0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.28 0.08, 0.13 -0.13 0.03
10 Perspective Taking 0.30 -0.09 0.08 0.34 0.41* 0.44* 0.58** 0.12 0.13
Note. * = P <  0.05, ** = P <  0.01, n=29
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Bar graph representing the mean and standard error of the log of the ratio of mu 
desynchronization for each of the three conditions. The asterisk represents the first 
planned contrast that demonstrated significantly more desynchronization of the average 
of the White and Black condition relative to the noise.condition, N=18.
Figure 2. Bar graph representing the mean and standard error of the log of the ratio of mu 
desynchronization for each of the five conditions. The asterisk represents the first planned 
contrast that demonstrated significantly more desynchronization of the average of the 
White ingroup, White outgroup, Black ingroup, and Black outgroup condition relative to 
the noise condition, N=29.
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Appendix A
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI).
INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate 
letter on the scale at the top of the page: A, B, C, D, or E. When you have decided on 
your answer, fill in the letter next to the item number. READ EACH ITEM 
CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can. Thank you. 
ANSWER SCALE:
1
Does Not 
Describe Me 
Very Well
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.
(f s >
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people l ess fortunate than me. (EC)
3. ,1 sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (PT)(-)
4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.
(EC) (-)
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS)
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD)
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely
caught up in it. (FS) (-)
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT)
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.
(EC)10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle pf a very emotional situation.
(p° )
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from
their perspective. (PT)
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.
(ps) o  .
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-)
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-)
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other
people's arguments. (PT) (-)
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. (FS)
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD)
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for
them. (EC) (-)
2 3 4 5
Describes Me 
Very Well
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19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-)
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC)
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT)
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC)
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading
character. (FS)
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD)
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
(PT)
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the
events in the story were happening to me. (FS)
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD)
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their
place. (PT)
NOTE: (-) denotes item to be scored in reverse fashion 
PT = perspective-taking scale 
FS = fantasy scale 
EC = empathic concern scale 
PD = personal distress scale 
A = 0 
B = 1 
C = 2 
D = 3 
E = 4
Except for reversed-scored items, which are scored:
A = 4 
B = 3 
C = 2 
D = 1 
E = 0
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Appendix B
Familiarity Questionnaire.
On this paper, please list the initials of up to 20 of your closest friends. You may also list 
acquaintances. When you are finished, continue to the next page.
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Look at your list of your 20 friends/acquaintances that you just generated. Indicate how 
many of those individuals are Black. ________
Please indicate how much you agree with each of the following statements:
• I often talk to Black people in college.
1
strongly
disagree
2
sort of 
disagree
3
not sure
4
sort of 
agree
I often see Black people outside of college.
1
strongly
disagree
2
sort of 
disagree
3
not sure
I often hang out with Black people.
1
strongly
disagree
2
sort of 
disagree
not sure
4
sort of 
agree
4
sort of 
agree
5
strongly
agree
5
strongly
agree
5
strongly
agree
Please indicate how often you do each of the following activities.
• How often do you spend time with Black friends at their place?
1
never
2 3 4 5
rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often do you have Black friends over to your place?
1
never
2 3 4 5
rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often have you helped someone Black with a problem they had in class?
1
never
2 3 4 5
rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often have you asked for/received help from someone Black when you had 
a problem in class?
1
never rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often have you given a Black person advice on a personal problem?
1 2 3 4 5
never rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often have you received advice from a Black person when you are having a 
personal problem?
1 2 3 4 5
never rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often have you comforted a Black person when they were upset or sad?
1 2 3 4 5
never rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often have you been comforted by a Black person when you were upset or 
sad?
1 2 3 4 5
never rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often have you worked with Black classmates on projects?
1 2 3 4 5
never rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
How often have you had a Black person on your team during sports or your 
group during other activities?
1 2 3 4 5
never rarely once in a while sometimes frequently
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Appendix C
Attitudes Towards Blacks (ATB).
1. If a Black person were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and 
direction from him or her.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree ag ree
2. If I had a chance to introduce Black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would be 
pleased to do so.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
3 .1 would rather not have blacks live in the same apartment building I live in.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
4 .1 would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a Black person in a 
public place.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
5 .1 would not mind it at all if a Black family with about the same income and education 
as me moved in next door.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
6 .1 think that Black people look more similar to each other than White people do.
1 2 3 4 5 6 v 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
7. Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the “who-am-I?” confusion which 
the children feel.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree ag ree
8 .1 get very upset when I hear a White person make a prejudicial remark about Black 
people.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
9 .1 favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
10. It would not bother me if my new roommate was Black.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
11. It is likely that Blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree ag ree
12.1 enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree ag ree
13. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices Blacks 
suffer at the hands of local authorities.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
14. Black and White people are inherently equal.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
15. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal rights.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly . strongly
d isagree ag ree
16. Whites should support Blacks in their struggle against discrimination and segregation.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree ag ree
17. Generally, Blacks are not as smart as Whites.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isag ree  ag ree
18.1 worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a 
promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
19. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited both Whites 
and Blacks.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
d isagree  ag ree
20. Some Blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
strongly strongly
disagree  ag ree
